How extractive power politics is accelerating in a warming world

By Polen Bahcebasi, TCC | Last updated on 23 January 2026

Greenland and the climate logic of geopolitics

In mid-January 2026, Greenland moved from the realm of geopolitical speculation to a credible site of confrontation. For years, talk of U.S. ambitions in the Arctic had been treated as provocation. That changed after Washington’s dramatic intervention in Venezuela, an operation that demonstrated how quickly extractive interests can translate into force when framed as matters of national security.

The events are not identical. Venezuela’s oil reserves have long sat at the centre of global energy politics, while Greenland’s strategic value has only recently sharpened into view. However, the sequence matters. The intervention in Venezuela altered the political atmosphere in which Greenland is now discussed. What once sounded implausible began to feel operational. Threats of military action that might previously have been dismissed as rhetorical were now read against a demonstrated willingness to act.

Greenland’s vulnerability is rooted in the transformation of the Arctic itself. Climate change is reshaping the material conditions that once kept Greenland at the margins of global power. As ice retreats and temperatures rise, the island is no longer insulated by remoteness. It is becoming legible as a territory, a resource base, and a strategic position, especially given its rich natural resources, including oil, natural gas, and critical minerals.

This is not a story of climate change as background context. It is a story of climate change as an active agent, reorganising what geopolitics can plausibly attempt to do. Greenland’s ice is melting, and with it the assumptions that once made intervention unthinkable.

Ice loss as a material driver of power

The Greenland ice sheet is one of the most important components of the global climate system. Satellite data from NASA’s GRACE mission shows that Greenland has lost ice at an average rate of roughly 260-270 gigatonnes per year since the early 2000s, contributing significantly to global sea-level rise. The IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report describes polar amplification as a defining feature of the climate crisis, with Arctic temperatures rising at least two to three times faster than the global average. That acceleration matters politically. It compresses time horizons and reshapes strategic calculation.

Greenland ice sheet mass losses between 2002 and 2025. NASA (2025)

As ice retreats, what was once inaccessible becomes conceivable. Coastlines shift. Infrastructure once deemed impossible begins to look viable. Geological surveys turn into investment prospectuses. Hence, climate change restructures the field of possibility in which power operates.

One visible consequence of Arctic warming is renewed attention to northern maritime routes. China and Russia have framed this transformation through the concept of a Polar Silk Road, positioning Arctic shipping lanes as future connectors between Asia and Europe as sea ice becomes less extensive. Symbolic voyages and pilot transits have reinforced this narrative, even as technical constraints, harsh conditions, and limited traffic continue to restrict large-scale commercial use.

Arctic shipping routes. Reuters, Copernicus & Al Jazeera (2026)

Greenland’s relevance within this picture is reported to be overstated or misunderstood. The main Arctic shipping routes do not run along its coastline. Greenland’s significance lies elsewhere. It sits near the junction between the Arctic and the North Atlantic. This region has long mattered for surveillance, early warning, and control of maritime and air approaches to North America and Europe.

Securitisation in a warming world

The concept of securitisation helps explain how climate-driven material change is translated into political urgency. International security studies define securitisation as the framing of an issue as an existential threat, enabling extraordinary measures that would otherwise be contested.

Greenland’s recent treatment fits this pattern. Right after the meeting between American, Danish, and Greenlandic authorities in Washington, the White House published a social media image depicting Greenland as facing a stark choice: align with the United States or be exposed to Russian and Chinese influence. The imagery was widely criticised due to its right-wing leaning “supremacist verbiage”, yet its function was clear. Greenland was reframed from a self-governing society navigating climate disruption into a security object whose future must be secured. Only a couple of weeks later, Trump addressed Greenland at Davos, repeating the narrative that “…no nation, or group of nations, is in any position to be able to secure Greenland other than the United States.”

This framing sits uneasily alongside assessments from Nordic officials and security analysts, who have noted that claims of Russian or Chinese naval activity around Greenland itself are exaggerated. Nevertheless, the Trump administration uses the argument to mask its true intent, which is neocolonial goals rooted in resource-extraction ambitions. This disjunction matters as it shows how climate change provides the material backdrop for securitisation, while securitisation supplies the political justification for action that may have little to do with immediate threats.

In a warming world, anticipated futures become sufficient grounds for present intervention.

Critical minerals, extractive capital and feedback loops

The climate lens is equally important when examining Greenland’s mineral resources. The island holds significant deposits of rare earth elements, which are essential for renewable energy technologies, defence systems, and even advancing AI’s technical infrastructure. Analysis by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies estimates that Greenland ranks among the world’s top countries for rare earth reserves, with approximately 1.5 million tonnes identified. In a global context where China currently dominates rare earth supply chains, access to alternative sources has become a strategic priority for the United States. Securing these materials is less about climate ambition than about industrial leverage, energy security, and limiting China’s capacity to consolidate control over the technologies that will cultivate future energy and defence systems.

These minerals sit at the intersection of climate policy, industrial strategy, and security planning. Efforts to decarbonise energy systems increase demand for rare earths, lithium, and other critical minerals. At the same time, climate change alters the feasibility and risk profile of extraction in fragile environments.

This intersection has attracted powerful private capital as well. Recent news headlines showed that some of the world’s wealthiest investors, including Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates, Michael Bloomberg, and Sam Altman, have backed mineral exploration firms such as KoBold Metals, which uses AI-driven techniques to identify deposits, including in Greenland. These investments reflect a familiar extractivist attitude, one in which climate disruption opens new frontiers for accumulation.

Key strategic resources in Greenland (Mining Visuals, 2026)

Mineral/Resources	Strategic Utility	Status & Technical Hurdles
Rare Earth Elements	EV magnets, wind turbines, guidance systems	Vast reserves require complex separation (SX) facilities to bypass Chinese refining.
Uranium & Lithium	Nuclear baseload, Li-ion batteries	Significant deposits; local political moratoriums on radioactive by-products remain a hurdle.
Zinc, Lead, & Gold	Infrastructure, electronics	Proven Tier-1 sites; active exploration; logistics require significant Capex.
Iron Ore & Zirconium	High-grade steel, aerospace	High-purity potential; high isolation costs necessitate mine lives of 20+ years.
Niobium & Tantalum	Superalloys, capacitors	Critical for the aerospace industry; seen as essential for supply chain diversification.
Offshore oil & gas	Energy generation; strategic reserves/energy security; leverage in global fossil fuel markets; feedstock for petrochemicals	An estimated 31–42 billion barrels of oil equivalent in offshore basins, long limited by cost, ice conditions, and environmental risk.

Material agency and the politics of possibility

Through Greenland’s case, a climate feedback loop appears. Climate science often focuses on feedback loops through albedo, ocean heat uptake, and permafrost methane, but the case in Greenland lets us add a political analogue. Fossil-fuel-driven warming reduces ice cover. Reduced ice increases access to minerals required for energy and technological systems. Extractive activity reinforces carbon-intensive economic structures and infrastructure, deepening the conditions that accelerate warming in the first place. The loop tightens, exemplifying how environmental change interacts with existing political and economic systems.

This is where theory clarifies rather than complicates. Political ecology and more-than-human traditions, associated with thinkers such as Bruno Latour, Donna Haraway, and Karen Barad, challenge a familiar assumption in political analysis: that politics acts upon a stable, external “nature”. Instead, they argue that agency is distributed. Material conditions actively shape what decisions become thinkable in the first place.

From this perspective, ice is not a passive backdrop to geopolitical ambition. Ice thickness, movement, and seasonal variability structure logistics, risk, and expectation. These influence where infrastructure can be built, how surveillance is conducted, and which forms of presence are viable. As material conditions change, so does the grammar of strategy.

Greenland is an early example of how climate change is reorganising geopolitics through both opportunity and disruption. Changes in the physical landscape affect the credibility of territorial ambitions on the ground. Risks posed by climate change are often discussed through the lens of scarcity and humanitarian risk. Yet, a warming planet is also creating new spaces for competition, conflict, securitisation, and extractive ambition.

That is why Greenland belongs on the environmental and international affairs agendas. Climate change is acting as an accelerator of geopolitical dynamics, shaping narratives, investments, and power relations long before physical thresholds are crossed. Treating climate as a secondary factor misses how deeply it is embedded in today’s strategic calculations.

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